Acta mathematica scientia,Series A ›› 2023, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (3): 921-929.

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Generic Stability of Cooperative Equilibria for Leader-Follower Population Games

Wu Wenjun,Yang Guanghui,Fang Caiya,Yang Hui*()   

  1. College of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025; Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory for Games Decision-Making and Control Systems, Guiyang 550025
  • Received:2022-01-07 Revised:2022-08-25 Online:2023-06-26 Published:2023-06-01
  • Contact: Hui Yang E-mail:huiyang@gzu.edu.cn
  • Supported by:
    NSFC(11271098);Talent Introduction Research Foundation of Guizhou University([2017]59);Guizhou Provincial Science and Technology Foundation([2019]1067);Educational Reform Foundation of Guizhou Province(2019008)

Abstract:

In this paper, we study the existence and generic stability of cooperative equilibria in leader-follower population games with a leader and multiple population followers. Firstly, a cooperative equilibrium of leader-follower population games is defined in consideration of cooperative behavior among population followers. Secondly, we prove the existence of cooperative equilibria, and an example is illustrated that cooperative equilibria exist and are different from the classical Nash equilibria. Finally, using Fort's theorem, we prove that in the sense of Baire category most cooperative equilibria of leader-follower population games are of generic stability under perturbations of payoff functions.

Key words: Leader-follower population games, Cooperative equilibria, Existence, Generic stability

CLC Number: 

  • O225
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