Acta mathematica scientia,Series A ›› 2023, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (4): 1311-1320.

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Bounded Rationality and Stability of Weakly Efficient Nash Equilibria for a Class of Population Games

Zhang Haiqun()   

  1. School of International Economics and Trade, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201209
  • Received:2022-05-23 Revised:2022-11-19 Online:2023-08-26 Published:2023-07-03

Abstract:

In this paper, we first introduce the model of population games with infinitely many criteria, and introduce the notion of weakly efficient Nash equilibria for the infinite-objective population games. Furthermore, we provide existence theorem of weakly efficient Nash equilibria. Finally, by constructing the model of bounded rationality, we study the stability of weakly efficient Nash equilibria under the bounded rationality.

Key words: Population games, Infinitely many criteria, Weakly efficient Nash equilibria, Bounded rationality, Stability.

CLC Number: 

  • O225
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