THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA

doi:10.1016/S0252-9602(17)30118-2

Abstract

Abstract:

Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work in Prisoner's Dilemma. By taking advantage of the modern control theory, the controller design is discussed and the optimal control is designed for promoting cooperation based on the recent advances in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Two control strategies are proposed:compensation control strategy for the cooperator when playing against a defector and reward control strategy for cooperator when playing against a cooperator. The feasibility and effectiveness of these control strategies for promoting cooperation in different stages are analyzed. The reward for cooperation can't prevent defection from being evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). On the other hand, compensation for the cooperator can't prevent defection from emerging and sustaining. By considering the effect and the cost, an optimal control scheme with constraint on the admissible control set is put forward. By analyzing the special nonlinear system of replicator dynamics, the exact analytic solution of the optimal control scheme is obtained based on the maximum principle. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated by examples.

Key words: evolutionary games, Prisoner's Dilemma, evolution of cooperation, promoting cooperation control, optimal control

Xian-jia WANG, Rui DONG, Lin CHEN. THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA[J].Acta mathematica scientia,Series B, 2018, 38(1): 73-92.

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