数学物理学报(英文版) ›› 2009, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (2): 456-464.doi: 10.1016/S0252-9602(09)60045-X

• 论文 • 上一篇    

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA

王先甲,刘伟兵   

  1. Economics and Management School of Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • 收稿日期:2007-05-27 出版日期:2009-03-20 发布日期:2009-03-20
  • 基金资助:

    The project supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(60574071)

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA

Wang Xianjia|Liu Weibing   

  1. Economics and Management School of Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • Received:2007-05-27 Online:2009-03-20 Published:2009-03-20
  • Supported by:

    The project supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(60574071)

摘要:

Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play-ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In this article, a pref-erence parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player’s degree of egoism and altruism (preference). Then, a game-theoretic dynamical
model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how prefer-ence influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results: egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.

关键词: Game theory, evolutionary game, prisoner’s dilemma, Birth-and-Death process, preference

Abstract:

Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play-ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In this article, a pref-erence parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player’s degree of egoism and altruism (preference). Then, a game-theoretic dynamical
model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how prefer-ence influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results: egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.

Key words: Game theory, evolutionary game, prisoner’s dilemma, Birth-and-Death process, preference

中图分类号: 

  • 91A22